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Abstract
Despite the rapid development of adversarial ma-
chine learning, most adversarial attack and de-
fense researches mainly focus on the perturbation-
based adversarial examples, which is constrained
by the input images. In comparison with exist-
ing works, we propose non-constrained adversar-
ial examples, which are generated entirely from
scratch without any constraint on the input. Un-
like perturbation-based attacks, or the so-called
unrestricted adversarial attack which is still con-
strained by the input noise, we aim to learn the
distribution of adversarial examples to generate
non-constrained but semantically meaningful ad-
versarial examples. Following this spirit, we pro-
pose a novel attack framework called AT-GAN
(Adversarial Transfer on Generative Adversarial
Net). Specifically, we first develop a normal GAN
model to learn the distribution of benign data, and
then transfer the pre-trained GAN model to es-
timate the distribution of adversarial examples
for the target model. In this way, AT-GAN can
learn the distribution of adversarial examples that
is very close to the distribution of real data. To
our knowledge, this is the first work of building
an adversarial generator model that could pro-
duce adversarial examples directly from any input
noise. Extensive experiments and visualizations
show that the proposed AT-GAN can very effi-
ciently generate diverse adversarial examples that
are more realistic to human perception. In addi-
tion, AT-GAN yields higher attack success rates
against adversarially trained models under white-
box attack setting and exhibits moderate transfer-
ability against black-box models.
*Equal contribution 1School of Computer Science and Technol-
ogy, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan,
China 2School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Sci-
ences, Peking University, Peking, China 3Department of Com-
puter Science, Cornell University, NY, USA. Correspondence
to: Kun He <brooklet60@hust.edu.cn>, Xiaosen Wang <xi-
aosen@hust.edu.cn>.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have exhibited impressive
performance on various computer vision tasks (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012; He et al., 2016). However, DNNs are also
found vulnerable to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2014), which has raised serious concerns on the safety of
deep learning models. For instance, Eykholt et al. (2018)
and Cao et al. (2019) have found that adversarial examples
can mislead the self-driving cars to make wrong decisions
on traffic signs and obstacles.
In recent years, numerous works of exploring adversarial
examples have been developed, including adversarial attack
(Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017), adver-
sarial defense (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2017;
Song et al., 2019) and the properties of adversarial exam-
ples (He et al., 2018; Shamir et al., 2019). However, most
studies mainly focus on the perturbation-based adversarial
examples constrained by the input images. In contrast, Song
et al. (2018) propose to generate unrestricted adversarial
examples using Generative Adversarial Net (GAN) (Good-
fellow et al., 2014) by searching adversarial noise around
the input noise. However, their method is still constrained
by the input noise, and time-consuming.
In this paper, we propose a novel attack framework called
AT-GAN (Adversarial Transfer on Generative Adversarial
Net), which aims to learn the distribution of adversarial
examples and generate a new type of adversarial examples,
called non-constrained adversarial examples. Unlike tra-
ditional perturbation-based attacks that search adversarial
examples around the input image, or the unrestricted adver-
sarial attack (Song et al., 2018) that searches adversarial
noise around the input noise, AT-GAN is an adversarial gen-
erator model that could produce semantically meaningful
adversarial examples directly from any input noise. This to
our knowledge is the first work of this category.
Specifically, we first develop a normal GAN model to learn
the distribution of benign data, then transfer the pre-trained
GAN model to estimate the distribution of adversarial ex-
amples for the target model. Note that once our generator
is transferred from generating normal images to adversarial
images, it can directly generate non-constrained adversarial
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examples for any input random noise, leading to high diver-
sity and efficiency. In general, AT-GAN is not only a new
way of generating adversarial examples, but also a useful
way to explore the distribution of adversarial examples.
To evaluate the effectiveness of AT-GAN, we develop
AT-GAN on three benchmark datasets, MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST and CelebA, and apply typical defense methods to
compare AT-GAN with other perturbation-based or unre-
stricted attack methods. Empirical results show that the non-
constrained adversarial examples generated by AT-GAN
yields higher attack success rates, and state-of-the-art ad-
versarially trained models exhibit little robustness against
AT-GAN, indicating the high diversity of the generated
examples. Besides, AT-GAN is more efficient than the
gradient-based or query-based adversarial attacks in gener-
ating adversarial instances.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first give the definitions of different types
of adversarial examples, then introduce Generative Adver-
sarial Net (GAN) that will be used in our method, and pro-
vide more details of unrestricted adversarial examples which
are most related to our work. The related works on typical
adversarial attack and defense methods are introduced in
Appendix A.
Let X be the set of the legal images, Y ∈ R be the output
label space and pz be an arbitrary probability distribution,
such as Gaussian distribution. The classifier f : X → Y
takes an image x and predicts its label f(x). Suppose px
and padv are the distributions of benign and adversarial
examples respectively.
2.1. Adversarial Examples
Assume we have an oracle o : X → Y , which could always
predict the correct label for any input x ∈ X , we can define
several types of adversarial examples as follows:
For perturbation-based adversarial examples, tiny perturba-
tions are added to input images, which are undetectable by
human but can cause the target classifier to make wrong
prediction.
Definition 1. Perturbation-based Adversarial Examples.
Given a subset (trainset or testset) T ⊂ X and a small con-
stant  > 0, the perturbation-based adversarial examples can
be defined as: Ap = {xadv ∈ X |∃x ∈ T , ‖x − xadv‖p <
 ∧ f(xadv) 6= o(xadv) = f(x) = o(x)}.
Song et al. (2018) define a new type of adversarial examples,
called unrestricted adversarial examples, which add adver-
sarial perturbation to the input noise of a mapping like GAN
so that the output of the perturbed noise is an adversary for
the target classifier.
Definition 2. Unrestricted Adversarial Examples. Given
a mapping G from z ∼ pz to G(z) ∼ pθ, where pθ is
an approximation distribution of px, and a small constant
 > 0, unrestricted adversarial examples can be defined
as: Au = {G(z∗) ∈ X |∃z ∼ pz, z∗ ∼ pz, ‖z − z∗‖p <
 ∧ f(G(z∗)) 6= o(G(z∗)) = f(G(z)) = o(G(z))}.
In this work, we define a new type of adversarial examples,
called non-constrained adversarial examples, in which we
train a mapping like GAN to learn the distribution of ad-
versarial examples so as to generate adversaries from any
noise.
Definition 3. Non-constrained Adversarial Examples.
Given a mapping G∗ from z ∼ pz to G∗(z) ∼ qθ,
where qθ is an approximation distribution of padv, the
non-constrained adversarial examples can be defined as:
An = {G∗(z) ∈ X |o(G∗(z) 6= f(G∗(z))}.
In summary, perturbation-based adversarial examples are
based on perturbing an image x ∈ X , and unrestricted ad-
versarial examples are based on perturbing an input noise
z ∼ pz for an existing mapping G. In contrast, non-
constrained adversarial examples are more generalized that
we learn a mapping G∗ such that for any input noise sam-
pled from distribution pz , the output can fool the classifier.
It is clear that Ap ⊂ Au ⊂ An from the above definitions.
2.2. Generative Adversarial Net
Generative Adversarial Net (GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
consists of two neural networks, G and D, trained in opposi-
tion to each other. The generator G is optimized to estimate
the data distribution and the discriminator D aims to dis-
tinguish fake samples from G and real samples from the
training data. The objective of D and G can be formalized
as a min-max value function V (G,D):
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) = Ex∼px [logD(x)]+
Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z)))].
Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Net (DCGAN)
(Radford et al., 2016) is the convolutional version of GAN,
which implements GAN with convolutional networks and
stabilizes the training process. Auxiliary Classifier GAN
(AC-GAN) (Odena et al., 2017) is another variant that ex-
tends GAN with some conditions by an extra classifier C.
The objective function of AC-GAN can be formalized as
follows:
min
G
max
D
min
C
V (G,D,C) = Ex∼px [logD(x)]
+ Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z, y)))]
+ Ex∼px [log(1− C(x, y))]
+ Ez∼pz [log(1− C(G(z, y), y))].
To make GAN more trainable in practice, Arjovsky et al.
(2017) propose Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) that uses
Wassertein distance so that the loss function has more de-
sirable properties. Gulrajani et al. (2017) introduce WGAN
with gradient penalty (WGAN GP) which outperforms
WGAN in practice. Its objective function is formulated
as:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼px [D(x)]−
Ez∼pz [D(G(z))]− λExˆ∼pxˆ [(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2],
where pxˆ is uniformly sampling along straight lines between
pairs of points sampled from the data distribution px and
the generator distribution pg .
2.3. Unrestricted Adversarial Examples
Song et al. (2018) propose to construct Unrestricted Ad-
versarial Examples using AC-GAN. Specifically, given an
arbitrary noise vector z0, their method aims to search a
noise input z∗ in the -neighborhood of z0 for AC-GAN
so as to produce an adversarial example G(z∗, ys) for the
target model f , whereas G(z∗, ys) can be still classified as
ys for the extra classifier C. The objective function can be
written as:
z∗ = arg min
z
{λ1
m
m∑
i=1
max(|zi − z0i | − , 0)
− λ2 logC(ys|G(z∗, ys))
−maxy 6=ys log f(y|G(z∗, ys))} ,
where C(y|x) (or f(y|x)) denotes the confidence of predic-
tion label y for the given input x on classifier C (or f ).
Though G(z∗, ys) can be classified correctly by C, it can-
not assure that G(z∗, ys) is a realistic image for human
eye (Nguyen et al., 2015). Therefore, their method needs
human evaluation for the generated adversarial examples.
3. The Proposed AT-GAN
In this section, we first introduce the estimation on the
distribution of adversarial examples, then propose the AT-
GAN framework to generate non-constrained adversarial
examples, and provide further analysis that AT-GAN can
learn the distribution of adversarial examples in the end.
3.1. Estimating the Adversarial Distribution
In order to generate non-constrained adversarial examples,
we need to estimate the distribution of adversarial examples
padv(xadv|y). Given the parameterized estimated distribu-
tion qθ(x), we can define the estimation problem as
qθ∗(xadv|y) = arg min
θ∈Ω
KL(qθ(xadv|y)‖padv(xadv|y)),
(1)
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Figure 1. Estimating the distribution of adversarial examples qθ
in two stages: 1) estimate the distribution of benign data pθ . 2)
transfer pθ to estimate qθ .
where θ indicates trainable parameters and Ω is the parame-
ter space.
It is hard to calculate Eq. 1 directly as padv(xadv|y) is
unknown. Inspired by the perturbation-based adversarial
examples, as shown in Figure 1, we postulate that for each
adversarial example xadv, there exists some benign exam-
ples xwhere ‖x−xadv‖p < . In other words, padv(xadv|y)
is close to p(x|y) to some extent. By Bayes’ theorem, we
have
p(x|y) = p(y|x) · p(x)
p(y)
.
Thus, we can approximately solve Eq. 1 in two stages: 1) Fit
the distribution of benign data pθ. 2) Transfer pθ to estimate
the distribution of adversarial examples qθ.
Specifically, we propose a new adversarial attack model
called AT-GAN to learn the distribution of adversarial ex-
amples. The overall architecture of AT-GAN is illustrated
in Figure 2. Corresponding to the above two training stages,
we first train the GAN model to get a generator Goriginal to
learn pθ, then we transfer Goriginal to attack ftarget for the
learning of qθ.
3.2. Training the Original Generator
Figure 2 (a) illustrates the overall architecture of AC-
WGAN GP that we used as the normal GAN. AC-
WGAN GP is the combination of AC-GAN (Odena et al.,
2017) and WGAN GP (Gulrajani et al., 2017), composed by
three neural networks: a generator G, a discriminator D and
a classifier f . The generator G takes a random noise z and
a lable y as the inputs and generates an image G(z, y). It
aims to generate an image G(z, y) that is indistinguishable
to discriminator D and makes the classifier f to output label
y. The loss function of G can be formulated as:
LG(z, y) =Ez∼pz(z)[H(f(G(z, y)), y)]
− Ez∼pz(z)[D(G(z))].
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Figure 2. The architecture of AT-GAN. The first training stage of AT-GAN is similar to that of AC-WGAN GP. After G is trained, we
regard G as the original model Goriginal and transfer Goriginal to train the adversarial generator Gattack to fool the target classifier.
After the second stage of training, AT-GAN can generate adversarial examples by Gattack.
Here H(a, b) is the entropy between a and b. The discrim-
inator D takes the training data x or the generated data
G(z, y) as the input and tries to distinguish them. The loss
function of D with gradient penalty for samples xˆ ∼ pxˆ can
be formulated as:
LD(x, z, y) =− Ex∼pdata(x)[D(x)]
+ Ez∼pz(z)[D(G(z, y))]
+ λExˆ∼pxˆ(xˆ)[(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2].
The classifier f takes the training data x or the generated
data G(z, y) as the input and predicts the corresponding
label. There is no difference from other classifiers and the
loss function is:
Lf (x, y) =Ex∼pdata(x)[H(f(x), y)]+
Ez∼pz(z)[H(f(G(z, y)), y)].
Note that the goal of this stage is to train a generator G
which could output realistic samples and estimate the dis-
tribution of real data properly so that we could later on
transfer the generator G to estimate the distribution of ad-
versarial examples. So one could train a generator G using
other methods as long as the generator G could learn a good
distribution of the real data.
3.3. Transferring the Generator for Attack
After the original generator Goriginal is trained, we transfer
the generator Goriginal to learn the distribution of adver-
sarial examples in order to attack the target model. As
illustrated in Figure 2b, there are three neural networks,
including the original generator Goriginal, the attack gener-
ator Gattack to be transferred that has the same weights as
Goriginal in the beginning, and the classifier ftarget to be
attacked. The goal of the second stage can be described as:
G∗attack = arg min
Gattack
||Goriginal(z, y)−Gattack(z, y)||p
s. t. ftarget(G(z, y)) = yt 6= y, (2)
where yt denotes the target adversarial label, ‖ · ‖p denotes
the `p norm and we focus on p = 2 in this work.
To optimize Eq. 2, we construct the loss function by La and
Ld, where La aims to assure that ftarget yields the target
label yt:
La(z, y) = Ez∼pz [H(ftarget(Gattack(z, y)), yt)], (3)
and Ld aims to assure that the adversarial generator Gattack
generates realistic examples:
Ld(z, y) = Ez∼pz [||Goriginal(z, y)+ρ−Gattack(z, y)||p].
(4)
Here ρ is a random noise constrained by both l0 and l∞
norm.
The objective function for transferring Goriginal to Gattack
can be formulated as:
L(z, y) = αLa(z, y) + βLd(z, y), (5)
where α and β are hyperparameters to control the training
process. Note that in the case that α = 1 and β →∞, the
objective function is similar to that of the perturbation-based
attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Tramr et al., 2018; Madry
et al., 2018).
For the untargeted attack, we can replace yt in La with
maxy 6=ys C(Gattack(z, ys)), where C(·) is the logits of the
target classifier ftarget.
3.4. Theoretical Analysis of AT-GAN
In this subsection, we provide theoretical analysis why AT-
GAN can generate as realistic and diverse non-constrained
adversarial examples as real data. We will prove that under
ideal condition, AT-GAN can estimate the distribution of
adversarial examples which is close to that of real data as
described in Section 3.1.
Suppose pdata is the distribution of real data, pg and pa are
the distribution learned by the generator of AC-WGAN GP
and AT-GAN respectively. For the optimization of Eq. 2,
Ld aims to constrain the image generated by Gattack in
the -neighborhood of Goriginal. We prove that under the
ideal condition that Ld guarantees Gattack(z, y) to be close
enough to Goriginal(z, y) for any input noise z, the dis-
tribution of AT-GAN almost coincides the distribution of
AC-WGAN GP. Formally, we state our result for the two
distributions as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose maxz,y Ld(z, y) < , we have
KL(pa‖pg)→ 0 when → 0.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix C. Samangouei
et al. (2018) prove that the global optimum of WGAN is
pg = pdata and we can show that the optimum of AC-
WGAN GP has the same property. We can formalize the
property as follows:
Theorem 2. The global minimum of the virtual training of
AC-WGAN GP is achieved if and only if pg = pdata.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix C. According to
Theorem 1 and 2, under the ideal condition, we conclude
pa ≈ pg = pdata, which indicates that the distribution of
adversarial examples learned by AT-GAN is very close to
that of real data as discussed in Section 3.1, so that the non-
constrained adversarial instances are as realistic and diverse
as the real data.
4. Experiments
To validate the effectiveness of AT-GAN, we empirically
evaluate our non-constrained adversarial examples on vari-
ous datasets, and demonstrate that AT-GAN yields higher
attack success rates against adversarial training and achieves
moderate transferability with higher efficiency. Besides, AT-
GAN can learn a distribution of adversarial examples which
is close to the real data distribution, and generate realistic
and diverse adversarial examples.
4.1. Experimental Setup
Datasets. We consider three standard datasets, namely
MNIST (LeCun et al., 1989), Fashion-MNIST (Xiao et al.,
2017) and CelebA (Liu et al., 2015). Specifically, MNIST
is a dataset of hand written digit number from 0 to 9.
Fashion-MNIST is similar to MNIST with 10 categories
of fashion clothes. CelebA is a dataset with more than
200, 000 celebrity images, and we group them according to
female/male and focus on gender classification as in Song
et al. (2018). For all datasets, we normalize the pixel values
into range [0, 1].
Baselines. We compare the proposed AT-GAN with typical
perturbation-based adversarial attacks, i.e., FGSM (Good-
fellow et al., 2015), PGD (Madry et al., 2018), R+FGSM
(Tramr et al., 2018) and unrestricted adversarial attack (Song
et al., 2018).
Models. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we adopt four
models used in Tramr et al. (2018), denoted as Model A
to D. For CelebA, we consider three models, namely CNN,
VGG16 and ResNet. More details about the architectures
are provided in Appendix C.
Evaluation Setup. To evaluate the performance of these
attacks, we consider normal training and existing strong
defenses, namely adversarial training (Goodfellow et al.,
2015), ensemble adversarial training (Tramr et al., 2018)
and iterative adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018).
All experiments are conducted on a single Titan X GPU.
The hyper-parameters used in the experiments are described
in Appendix C.
4.2. Evaluation Results
4.2.1. COMPARISON ON ATTACK SUCCESS RATE
To validate the efficacy, we compare AT-GAN with other
baseline attack methods under white-box setting. Since
Athalye et al. (2018) have shown that the currently most
effective defense method is adversarial training, we consider
adversarially trained models as the defense models. The
attack success rates are reported in Table 1.
On MNIST, AT-GAN is the best attack method against all
the defense models. As for Model A, B and C by normal
training, AT-GAN gains the second highest attack success
rates over 98%. On Fashion-MNIST, AT-GAN achieve the
highest attack success rate on average. On CelebA, AT-GAN
achieves the best attack performance almost on all models.
The only exceptions are that Song et al. (2018) achieves the
highest attack rate on VGG, and PGD achieves the highest
attack rate on ResNet by normal training respectively. Under
the two cases, the results of AT-GAN are still close to the
best results.
On average, AT-GAN achieves the highest attack success
rate on all defense models. As AT-GAN aims to estimate
the distribution of adversarial examples, adversarial training
with some specific attacks has little robustness against AT-
GAN, raising a new security issue for the development of
more generalized adversarially training models.
Table 1. Attack success rate (%) of adversarial examples generated by AT-GAN and the baselines attacks under white-box attack setting
against models by normal training and various adversarial training methods. For each model, the highest attack success rate is highlighted
in bold. Nor.: Normal training, Adv.: Adversarial training, Ens.: Ensemble adversarial training, Iter. Adv.: Iterative adversarial training.
(a) Comparison of AT-GAN and other attacks on MNIST.
Attack Model A Model B Model C Model D
Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter.
Clean Error (%) 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.7 2.6 2.6 1.5
FGSM 68.8 2.9 8.7 4.0 88.0 9.5 18.0 9.2 70.7 4.3 7.8 4.7 89.6 23.5 34.6 26.7
PGD 100.0 92.6 85.1 5.9 100.0 42.4 98.2 36.2 100.0 76.9 96.4 9.6 91.7 96.8 99.5 81.1
R+FGSM 77.9 28.4 20.3 2.6 96.5 7.1 42.1 4.6 81.6 7.2 19.9 2.9 93.8 76.2 51.6 25.3
Song’s 82.0 70.5 75.0 84.6 76.9 65.0 72.0 80.7 74.2 75.6 72.6 87.8 67.7 43.6 56.3 44.5
AT-GAN 98.7 97.5 96.7 91.4 99.5 97.7 99.3 95.6 99.3 95.8 96.9 90.0 99.9 99.9 99.5 99.7
(b) Comparison of AT-GAN and other attacks on Fashion-MNIST.
Attack Model A Model B Model C Model D
Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter.
Clean Error (%) 8.2 8.3 8.0 10.5 9.8 9.3 10.4 9.3 7.8 8.1 7.9 10.0 14.8 13.7 14.5 10.6
FGSM 82.7 14.6 36.0 23.2 82.3 24.2 30.0 23.8 82.7 11.0 47.8 22.3 77.2 33.8 47.5 22.9
PGD 99.9 82.6 90.8 30.2 96.0 69.9 95.3 34.7 100.0 88.3 99.9 28.8 85.4 54.7 76.8 30.2
R+FGSM 95.5 63.3 68.4 37.8 90.9 74.2 81.3 28.2 98.4 76.5 71.3 31.2 88.3 45.3 62.1 33.6
Song’s 93.1 96.7 95.3 82.1 80.3 88.5 92.2 80.0 96.5 95.6 96.6 83.2 66.8 49.2 63.1 84.6
AT-GAN 96.1 92.7 95.4 93.5 98.5 91.1 93.6 91.6 98.0 88.9 93.9 91.6 99.9 99.4 99.1 93.1
(c) Comparison of AT-GAN and other attacks on CelebA.
Attack CNN VGG ResNet
Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter.
Clean Error (%) 2.7 2.7 3.2 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.5
FGSM 81.2 11.8 14.7 9.5 76.7 10.6 16.2 8.9 98.7 9.8 12.3 9.5
PGD 97.3 16.4 22.6 11.4 87.9 14.6 26.3 10.7 100.0 10.9 15.1 10.5
R+FGSM 68.7 9.5 11.3 7.9 68.4 8.7 13.2 7.3 97.5 7.9 9.5 7.8
Song’s 90.6 83.4 85.7 89.8 98.7 87.5 95.7 81.6 99.2 93.4 91.0 90.6
AT-GAN 97.5 98.9 95.9 99.6 97.1 96.7 95.8 97.8 98.4 98.5 97.3 98.5
4.2.2. COMPARISON ON ATTACK EFFICIENCY
There are many scenarios where one needs large amount of
adversarial examples, such as adversarial training or explor-
ing the properties of adversarial examples. The efficiency
for adversarial attacks to generate adversarial examples is
significant, but is ignored in most previous works.
As an adversarial generation model, AT-GAN can gener-
ate adversarial examples very quickly. Here we evaluate
the efficiency of each attack method to attack Model A on
MNIST data as an example. The average time of generat-
ing 1000 adversarial examples is summarized in Table 2.
Among the five attack methods, AT-GAN is the fastest as
it could generate adversarial examples without the target
classifier and gradient calculation once it is trained. Note
that Song et al. (2018) needs much longer time than others
because it needs multiple searches and queries to generate
one adversarial example.
Table 2. Comparison on the example generation time, measured by
generating 1000 adversarial instances using Model A on MNIST.
FGSM PGD R+FGSM Song’s AT-GAN
Time 0.3s 1.8s 0.4s ≥ 2.5min 0.2s
4.2.3. VISUALIZATION OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
The goal of adversarial examples is to fool neural networks
but not to fool humans. Thus, we illustrate some adversarial
examples generated by different attacks for Molde A on
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, and CNN on CelebA.
FGSM
PGD
R+FGSM
Song's
AT-GAN
(a) Adversarial examples for Model A on MNIST
FGSM
PGD
R+FGSM
Song's
AT-GAN
(b) Adversarial examples for Model A on Fashion-MNIST)
FGSM
PGD
R+FGSM
Song's
AT-GAN
Source	Class:	Female Source	Class:	Male
(c) Adversarial examples for CNN on CelebA
Figure 3. Adversarial examples generated by various methods on three datasets (Zoom in for details). The red borders indicate unrealistic
adversarial examples generated by Song’s method or AT-GAN.
As shown in Figure 3, on MNIST, AT-GAN generates
slightly more realistic images than Song et al. (2018), for
example on 0 and 3. On both Fashion-MNIST and CelebA,
some adversarial examples generated by Songs method are
not as realistic as AT-GAN to human perception, for exam-
ple on t-shirt/top (0) , sandal (5) and the details of some
faces. As for perturbation-based attack, their adversarial
examples are not clear enough especially on MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST datasets due to the adversarial perturba-
tions. More non-constrained adversarial examples generated
by AT-GAN for target attack are shown in Appendix C.
In general, AT-GAN can generate realistic and diverse
adversarial examples as Eq. 1 forces the generated non-
constrained adversarial examples to be close enough to the
benign examples generated by the original generator.
4.3. Transferability of AT-GAN
One important feature for adversarial examples is the trans-
ferability across different models. To demonstrate the
transferability of non-constrained adversarial examples, we
use adversarial examples generated by attacking Model
A (MNIST and Fashion-MNIST) and CNN (CelebA), to
evaluate the attack success rates on Model C (MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST) and VGG (CelebA).
As shown in Table 3, non-constrained adversarial exam-
ples generated by AT-GAN exhibit moderate transferability
although it is not always the best. Note that as shown in Sec-
tion 4.2.3, adversarial examples generated by other attack
methods are not as realistic as non-constrained adversarial
examples and less realistic images could result in a higher
transferability.
4.4. Visualization of Adversarial Distribution
As discussed in Section 3.4, we give a brief analysis that
AT-GAN can learn a distribution of adversarial examples
which is close to the distribution of real data. To identify
this empirically, we randomly choose 5, 000 benign images
and 5, 000 adversarial examples generated by different at-
tack methods, and merge these images according to their
real label for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. Then we use
t-SNE (Maaten & Hinton, 2008) on these images to illus-
trate the distributions in 2 dimensions. T-SNE models each
high-dimensional object in such a way that similar objects
are modeled by nearby points and dissimilar objects are
modeled by distant points with high probability. It indicates
that, if the adversarial examples have different distribution
Table 3. Transferability of non-constrained adversarial examples and other traditional adversarial examples on the three datasets. For
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets, we attack Model C with adversarial examples generated on Model A. For CelebA dataset, we
attack VGG using adversarial examples generated on CNN. Numbers represent the attack success rate (%).
MNIST Fashion-MNIST CelebA
Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Adv. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Adv. Nor. Adv. Ens. Iter. Adv.
FGSM 46.7 4.2 1.7 4.6 68.9 23.1 20.8 14.8 15.6 4.3 3.3 4.1
PGD 97.5 6.5 4.1 4.1 84.7 27.6 39.6 14.6 18.3 4.3 3.1 4.1
R+FGSM 82.3 6.7 4.8 4.1 21.2 32.1 17.5 26.3 11.0 4.0 3.3 3.8
Song’s 23.8 20.8 20.6 20.1 39.2 34.0 31.5 30.3 9.6 31.8 21.5 38.8
AT-GAN 65.3 24.6 27.9 17.2 58.0 22.7 32.0 15.2 63.7 15.4 16.5 17.6
(a) Test set (b) FGSM (c) PGD (d) R+FGSM (e) Song (f) AT-GAN
Figure 4. T-SNE visualizations for the combination of test set and adversarial examples generated by different adversarial attacks on
MNIST (top) and Fashion-MNIST (bottom). For (a), we use 10,000 sampled real images in test set. For (b) to (f), we use 5,000 sampled
images in test set and 5,000 adversarial examples generated by different attacks. The position of each class is random due to the property
of t-SNE.
from that of the benign data, t-SNE could not deal well with
them and the points with different categories will overlap
with each other after dimension reduction, i.e., the results
will be in chaos.
The results are illustrated in Figure 4. For AT-GAN, differ-
ent categories are separated as that of the test set while those
of other methods are mixed with each other. It indicates the
distribution that AT-GAN learned is indeed very close to the
distribution of real data.
5. Conclusion
We propose an adversarial generator model which could
generate non-constrained adversarial example for any input
noise sampled from a distribution such as Gaussian dis-
tribution. Unlike perturbation-based adversarial examples
that perturbs the input image or unrestricted adversarial ex-
amples that perturbs the input noise, our non-constrained
adversarial examples are generated entirely from scratch
without any constraint.
Specifically, we propose a novel attack framework called
AT-GAN to estimate the distribution of adversarial examples
that could be very close to the distribution of real data. Ex-
tensive experiments and visualizations show that AT-GAN
can generate diverse and realistic non-constrained adversar-
ial examples efficiently. Besides, AT-GAN achieves higher
attack success rates under white-box setting and exhibits
moderate transferability.
Our work of AT-GAN suggests that adversarial training,
i.e., current strongest defense based on perturbation-based
adversarial examples, could not guarantee the robustness
against non-constrained adversarial examples. A possible
reason is that AT-GAN learns a more complete version on
the distribution of adversarial examples, which is much
more diverse than that of the perturbation-based method.
Our method also offers a new way of building adversarial
attacks by designing an adversarial generator directly, which
may inspire more researches of this category in future work.
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A. Related Work
A.1. Gradient-based Attacks
There are two types of attacks regarding how the attacks
access the model. The white-box attack can fully access the
target model, while the black-box attack (Carlini & Wagner,
2017) has no knowledge of the target model. Existing black-
box attacks mainly focus on transferability (Liu et al., 2017;
Bhagoji et al., 2017), in which an adversarial instance gen-
erated on one model could be transferred to attack another
model.
We will introduce three typical adversarial attack methods.
Here the components of all adversarial examples are clipped
in [0, 1].
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM (Goodfellow
et al., 2015) adds perturbation in the gradient direction of
the training loss J on the input x to generate adversarial
examples.
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y))
Here y is the true label of a sample x, θ is the model pa-
rameter and  specifies the `∞ distortion between x and
xadv .
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). PGD adver-
sary (Madry et al., 2018) is a multi-step variant of FGSM,
which applies FGSM iteratively for k times with a budget
α.
xadvt+1 = clip(xadvt + αsign(∇xJ(θ, xadvt , y)),
xadvt − , xadvt + )
xadv0 = x, xadv = xadvk
Here clip(x, p, q) forces its input x to reside in the range of
[p, q].
Rand FGSM (R+FGSM). R+FGSM (Tramr et al., 2018)
first applies a small random perturbation on the benign
image with a parameter α (α < ), then it uses FGSM
to generate an adversarial example based on the perturbed
image.
xadv = x
′ + (− α) · sign(∇x′J(θ, x′, y))
where x′ = x+ α · sign(N (0d, Id))
A.2. Adversarial Training
There are many defense strategies, such as detecting ad-
versarial perturbations (Metzen et al., 2017), obfuscating
gradients (Buckman et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018) and
eliminating perturbations (Shen et al., 2017; Liao et al.,
2018), among which adversarial training is the most effec-
tive method (Athalye et al., 2018). We list several adversar-
ial training methods as follows.
Adversarial training. Goodfellow et al. (2015) first intro-
duce the method of adversarial training, where the standard
loss function f for a neural network is modified as:
J˜(θ, x, y) = αJf (θ, x, y) + (1− α)Jf (θ, xadv, y).
Here y is the true label of a sample x and θ is the model’s
parameter. The modified objective is to make the neural
network more robust by penalizing it to count for adversar-
ial samples. During the training, the adversarial samples
are calculated with respect to the current status of the net-
work. Taking FGSM for example, the loss function could
be written as:
J˜(θ, x, y) =αJf (θ, x, y) + (1− α)Jf (θ, x+
sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)), y)
Ensemble adversarial training. Tramr et al. (2018) pro-
pose an ensemble adversarial training method, in which
DNN is trained with adversarial examples transferred from
a number of fixed pre-trained models.
Iterative adversarial training. Madry et al. (2018) pro-
pose to train a DNN with adversarial examples generated
by iterative methods such as PGD.
B. Theoretical Analysis of AT-GAN
In this section, we provide the proof of theorems in Section
3.4.
Theorem 3. Suppose maxz,y Ld(z, y) < , we have
KL(pa‖pg)→ 0 when → 0.
To prove this theorem, we first consider that given a distri-
bution p(x) in space X , we construct another distribution
q(x) by selecting the points p(x) in the -neighborhood
of p(x) for any x ∈ X . Obviously, when p(x) is close
enough to p(x), q(x) has almost the same distribution as
p(x). Formally, we can have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Given two distributions P and Q with proba-
bility density function p(x) and q(x) in space X , if there
exists a constant  that satisfies ‖q(x)− p(x)‖ <  for any
x ∈ X , we could get KL(P‖Q)→ 0 when → 0.
Proof. For two distributions P and Q with probability
density function p(x) and q(x), we could get q(x) =
p(x) + r(x) where ‖r(x)‖ < .
KL(P‖Q) =
∫
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
dx
=
∫
p(x) log p(x)dx−
∫
p(x) log q(x)dx
=∫
(q(x)− r(x)) log p(x)dx−∫
(q(x)− r(x)) log q(x)dx
=
∫
q(x) log p(x)dx−
∫
q(x) log q(x)dx
−
∫
r(x) log p(x)dx+
∫
r(x) log q(x)dx
=
∫
r(x) log
q(x)
p(x)
dx−KL(Q‖P )
≤
∫
 log(1 +

p(x)
)dx
Obviously, when  → 0, we could get ∫  log(1 +

p(x) )dx→ 0, which means DL(P‖Q)→ 0.
Now, we come to proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. For two distributions pa and pg, maxy,z Ld < 
indicates ∀z ∼ pz, ‖pa(z) − pg(z)‖ < . According to
Lemma 1, we have KL(pa‖pg) → 0 when  → 0. This
concludes the proof.
.
Theorem 4. The global minimum of the virtual training of
AC-WGAN GP is achieved if and only if pg = pdata.
Proof. To simplify the analysis, we choose a category y
of AC-WGAN GP and denote pg(x|y) and pdata(x|y) the
distribution the generator learns and the distribution of real
data respectively. Then for each category, the loss function
is equivalent to WGAN GP. We refers to Samangouei et al.
(2018) to prove this property. The WGAN GP min-max
loss is given by:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[D(x)]−
Ez∼pz(z)[D(G(z))]− λExˆ∼pxˆ(xˆ)[(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2]
=
∫
x
pdata(x)D(x)dx−
∫
z
pz(z)D(G(z))dz
− λ
∫
xˆ
pxˆ(xˆ)[(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2]dxˆ
=
∫
x
[pdata(x)− pg(x)]D(x)dx
− λ
∫
xˆ
pxˆ(xˆ)[(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2]dxˆ
(6)
For a fixed G, the optimal discriminator D that maximizes
V (D,G) should be:
D∗G(x) =
{
1 if pdata(x) ≥ pg(x)
0 otherwise (7)
According to Eq. 6 and Eq. 7, we could get:
V (D,G) =
∫
x
[pdata(x)− pg(x)]D(x)dx
− λ
∫
xˆ
pxˆ(xˆ)[(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2]dxˆ
=
∫
{x|pdata(x)≥pg(x)}
(pdata(x)− pg(x))dx
− λ
∫
xˆ
pxˆ(xˆ)dxˆ
=
∫
{x|pdata(x)≥pg(x)}
(pdata(x)− pg(x))dx− λ
(8)
Let X = {x|pdata(x) ≥ pg(x)}, in order to minimize Eq.
8, we set pdata(x) = pg(x) for any x ∈ X . Then, since
both pg and pdata integrate to 1, we could get:∫
X c
pg(x)dx =
∫
X c
pdata(x)dx.
However, this contradicts Eq. 7 where pdata(x) < pg(x)
for x ∈ X c, unless µ(X c) = 0 where µ is the Lebesgue
measure.
Therefore, for each category we have pg(x|y) = pdata(x|y)
which means pg(x) = pdata(x) for AC-WGAN GP.
C. More Details on Experiments
C.1. More Experimental Setup
Here we describe the details about the experimental
setup, including the model architectures and attack hyper-
paramters.
Model Architectures. We first describe the neural network
architectures used in experiments. The abbreviations for
components in the network are described in Table 4. The
architecture of AC-WGAN GP for MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST is shown in Table 5 where the generator and dis-
criminator are the same as in Chen et al. (2016), while the
architecture of AC WGAN GP for CelebA is same as in
Gulrajani et al. (2017). The details of Model A through
D are described in Table 6. Both Model A and Model C
have convolutional layers and fully connected layers. The
difference is only on the size and number of convolutional
filters. Model B uses dropout as its first layer and adopts
a bigger covolutional filter so that it has less number of
parameters. Model D is a fully connected neural network
with the least number of parameters and its accuracy will
be lower than other models. VGG in our experiments is the
same as VGG16 in Simonyan & Zisserman (2015) and we
adopt ResNet from Song et al. (2018).
Hyper-parameters. The hyper-parameters used in experi-
ments for each attack method are described in Table 7.
Table 4. The abbreviations for network architectures.
Abbreviation Description
Conv(m, k × k) A convolutional layer with m filters and filter size k
DeConv(m, k × k) A transposed convolutional layer with m filters and filters size k
Dropout(α) A dropout layer with probability α
FC(m) A fully connected layer with m outputs
Sigmoid The sigmoid activation function
Relu The Rectified Linear Unit activation function
LeakyRelu(α) The Leaky version of a Rectified Linear Unit with parameter α
Maxpool(k,s) The maxpooling with filter size k and stride s
Table 5. The architecture of WGAN GP with auxiliary classifier.
Generator Discriminator Classifier
FC(1024) + Relu Conv(64, 4× 4) + LeakyRelu(0.2) Conv(32, 3× 3) + Relu
FC(7× 7× 128) + Relu Conv(128, 4× 4) + LeakyRelu(0.2) pooling(2, 2)
DeConv(64, 4× 4) + Sigmoid FC(1024) + LeakyRelu(0.2) Conv(64, 3× 3) + Relu
DeConv(1, 4× 4) + Sigmoid FC(1) + Sigmoid pooling(2, 2)
FC(1024)
Dropout(0.4)
FC(10) + Softmax
C.2. Non-constrained Adversarial Examples for Target
Attack
Here we show some non-constrained adversarial examples
generated by AT-GAN for target attack. The results are
illustrated in Figure 5 and 6. Instead of adding perturbations
to the original images, AT-GAN transfers the generator so
that the generated adversarial instances are not in the same
shape of the initial examples (in diagonal) generated by the
original generator.
Table 6. The architectures of Models A through D and CNN used for classification. After each model’s name we put the number of
parameters of that model.
Model A (3,382,346) Model B (710,218) Model C (4,795,082)
Conv(64, 5× 5)+Relu Dropout(0.2) Conv(128, 3× 3)+Relu
Conv(64, 5× 5)+Relu Conv( 64, 8× 8)+Relu Conv( 64, 3× 3)+Relu
Dropout(0.25) Conv(128, 6× 6)+Relu Dropout(0.25)
FC(128)+Relu Conv(128, 5× 5)+Relu FC(128)+Relu
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Droopout(0.5)
FC(10)+Softmax FC(10)+Softmax FC(10)+Softmax
Model D (509,410) CNN (17, 066, 658)[
FC(300)+Relu
Dropout(0.5)
]
× 4 Conv(32, 3× 3)+ReluConv(32, 3× 3)+Relu
Dropout(0.3)
FC(10) + Softmax Conv(64, 3× 3)+Relu
Conv(64, 3× 3)+Relu
Maxpool(2, 2) + Dropout(0.3)
Conv(128, 3× 3)+Relu
Conv(128, 3× 3)+Relu
Maxpool(2, 2) + Dropout(0.3)
FC(512) + Relu
Dropout(0.3)
FC(10) + Softmax
Table 7. Hyper-paramters of different attack methods on the datasets.
Attack Datasets
MNIST Fashion-MNIST CelebA Norm
FGSM  = 0.3  = 0.1  = 0.015 `∞
PGD  = 0.3, α = 0.075, epochs = 20  = 0.1, α = 0.01, epochs = 20  = 0.015, α = 0.005, epochs = 20 `∞
R+FGSM  = 0.3, α = 0.15  = 0.2, α = 0.1  = 0.015, α = 0.003 `∞
Song’s λ1 = 100, λ2 = 0, epochs = 200 λ1 = 100, λ2 = 0, epochs = 200 λ1 = 100, λ2 = 100, epochs = 200 N/A
AT-GAN α = 2, β = 1, epochs = 100 α = 2, β = 1, epochs = 100 α = 3, β = 2, epochs = 200 N/A
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Figure 5. Adversarial examples generated by AT-GAN to different targets with the same random noise input for each row. The images on
the diagonal are generated by Goriginal which are not adversarial examples and treated as the initial instances for AT-GAN.
Figure 6. Adversarial examples generated by AT-GAN on CelebA dataset.
